Such a theory of coordination predicts, independent of its axioms:

* That coordination will often occur when there is misalignment conceptually, and where the alignment is simply enough to successfully achieve the coordination task
  + That in many cases this misalignment will not be detected, and that this is not a hindrance. We should be able to show this experimentally.
* That there exist some cases where alignment is more easily detectable than in others
  + It would be good to derive which cases these are within the formal framework, find their corresponding cases in empirical phenomena, and show that they have the predicted properties
* That there exist some cases where alignment is entirely undetectable
  + These cases are those that are often of most interest to philosophy of mind. They include the phenomenological cases. If we can provide proof (from within the system) that these cases are undetectable and that their indetectability is simply due to the structure of the systems and not to a metaphysical property, then we can push into the real of philosophy of mind.

Such predictions will help to justify the theoretical framework and associated theories.